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Welfare provisions for the older population occupy much of the political 
debate around reforms and sustainability of social security programs in 
Europe.
1 On the one hand, a higher life expectancy calls for a later 
retirement age in order to keep the balance between time spent working and 
time spent in retirement approximately constant. On the other hand, early 
retirement, unemployment and disability provisions are widespread benefits 
of social policy that workers do not want to give up easily. Since the 
increase in longevity has been accompanied with a decline in age-related 
morbidity, the costs of this social achievement in terms of lost production 
work and strain on the pay-as-you-go financed pension systems and old-age 
related welfare programs has become large. Hence, a widely held view 
amongst economists is that there is “unused capacity” for active work (see 
for example Gruber and Wise 1999 and 2004). 
This paper sheds light on the complex retirement patterns that have emerged 
in Europe during the recent decades. Retirement patterns, as we will see, are 
not only complex in each country, encompassing multi-stage pathways via 
specific pre-retirement schemes, unemployment and/or disability benefits, 
early retirement pensions and finally normal old-age pensions. They are also 
very different among European countries, in spite of very similar trends in 
mortality and morbidity. One obvious explanation for the complexity and 
                                                 
∗ The SHARE data collection has been primarily funded by the European Commission through the 
5th framework programme (project QLK6-CT-2001-00360 in the thematic programme Quality of 
Life). Additional funding came from the US National Institute on Aging (U01 AG09740-13S2, P01 
AG005842, P01 AG08291, P30 AG12815, Y1-AG-4553-01 and OGHA 04-064). Data collection in 
Austria (through the Austrian Science Fund, FWF), Belgium (through the Belgian Science Policy 
Office) and Switzerland (through BBW/OFES/UFES) was nationally funded. We are grateful to 
Susann Rohwedder for kindly providing her programming code for the lifetables. We thank Lorenzo 
Agnoletto, Lisa Callegaro, Christian Goldammer, Giacomo Masier, Giacomo Pinaffo, Stephanie 
Stuck, Fabian Terner and Elisabetta Trevisan for excellent research assistance. Axel Börsch-Supan: 
MEA Mannheim Research Institute for the Economics of Aging, University of Mannheim, 
axel@boersch-supan.de; Agar Brugiavini: Department of Economics, Ca’ Foscari University of 
Venice and SSAV, brugiavi@unive.it; Enrica Croda: Department of Economics, Ca’ Foscari 
University of Venice and SSAV, enrica.croda@unive.it. Comments welcome. 
1 See, for instance, European Commission (2004).  
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multitude of retirement patterns are the different institutional arrangements 
in each country. They affect both the supply of, and the demand for, labor at 
older ages. On the supply side, social security and pension arrangements 
create opportunities to retire at various ages. There are old-age pensions, 
disability pensions, sickness and unemployment benefits, which shape the 
various pathways to retirement, given the health and social conditions of 
older workers. Institutional arrangements also influence the demand side: it 
might be optimal for firms to discharge older workers when their 
productivity does not increase anymore but labor contracts still impose 
rising wages. Moreover, in many countries it is much cheaper to dismiss 
older rather than younger workers when a company is forced to restructure 
because severance payments to older workers are effectively subsidized by 
early retirement and disability benefits. 
Retirement is often described as a direct transition between a situation of 
full employment and a situation where the individual is fully inactive. 
However, many European countries have allowed and sometimes 
encouraged various forms of partial exits from the labor force, before access 
to normal retirement. The main tools for doing so have been partial 
retirement schemes, but in many cases pension benefits are not conditioned 
on being inactive, so that workers can continue working in another job (or 
even the same) after drawing pension benefits. Hence, exit from the labor 
force and entry into the pension system have become distinct events. Exit 
from the labor force can come earlier, at the same time, or later than the 
entry into the pension system, creating additional complexities in retirement 
patterns. 
This paper is by no means the first paper on retirement patterns in a 
European or broader international context, see e.g. the work by Kohli et al. 
(1991) and work by the team around Gruber and Wise (1999, 2004, 2007). 
Our paper, however, features two key novelties. First, we use the strictly 
harmonized data from the Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement in  
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Europe (SHARE).
2  The ex-ante and ex-post harmonization permits a much 
more precise comparison across countries than possible with earlier data 
sets. Second, SHARE includes not only socio-economic characteristics, but 
also health data. Health, although obviously a prima facie important driver 
of retirement, has rarely been used as a quantifiable factor in internationally 
comparable retirement analyses. 
Section 2 of this paper provides an overview of retirement patterns in 
Europe. In particular, we classify individuals according to a set of mutually 
exclusive self-reported labor force states. Independently of this self-report, 
we also ask whether individuals receive a pension, whether individuals 
receive labor income, and how many hours individuals actually work. This 
set of independent questions permits us a detailed analysis of the complex 
and often multi-staged retirement transitions. We show that the quantitative 
importance of these different routes varies considerably across countries, 
with the proportion of workers ranging between 20% (Italy and Austria) and 
40% (Switzerland and Sweden), while the share of retired individuals ranges 
between 36% (the Netherlands and Spain) and 62% (Austria). 
A striking finding is that in some countries the proportion of self-assessed 
“retired” individuals is smaller than the share of individuals who report that 
they are still working, hence mitigating somehow the amount of “inactivity” 
estimated for the SHARE respondents. 
Section 3 therefore studies the various pathways of retirement in detail. 
When looking at the various age-ranges, Austrians and Italians, both men 
and women, seem to exit the labor force at earlier ages than other 
Europeans. Furthermore, in most countries, exiting from the labor force 
does not necessarily lead to receipt of a public pension. In some countries, 
there is some substitutability between different forms of inactivity. For 
example, the disability pathway in the Netherlands is a well-known and 
well-documented aspect of early retirement in this country: the percentage 
                                                 
2 For a description see Börsch-Supan,  et al. (2005), and Börsch-Supan and Jürges (2006). See also 
www.share-project.org.  
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of disabled people in the 60-64 age group peaks to reach 15%, and it is 
clearly a substitute to unemployment or early retirement. 
The prima facie evidence discussed so far suggests that pension policies 
adopted by the different countries are an important determinant of labor 
force participation decisions at older ages. However, there are other 
determinants of labor force exits. A primary candidate is the health status of 
individuals. Section 4 therefore investigates the role of health status by 
restricting the attention to individuals who are in “good health”, i.e. to 
individuals who self-report absence of health problems and/or feature no 
limitations out of a battery of 14 activities of daily living. 
We observe a strikingly high frequency of individuals who are healthy 
and/or have no limitations but classify themselves as fully retired. This 
percentage is particularly high in Austria, France and Italy, and it holds even 
for individuals younger than age 60. Moreover, we find that the strikingly 
large international variation in disability insurance enrolment rates cannot 
be explained by health at all; rather, correcting for health status exacerbates 
these international differences. Institutional features, such as benefit 
generosity and the need for a medical exam before becoming eligible for 
disability benefits explain about 75% of the international variation. These 
findings strengthen the “unused capacity” view of many economists. 
So far, we have assembled cross-national evidence along several 
dimensions, such as institutions and health. Section 5 gives a closer look 
also at the within-country heterogeneity of retirement patterns and the role 
of all the many competing determinants of retirement. We provide a detailed 
multivariate econometric analysis where the explanatory power of all 
determinants can be evaluated jointly. We investigate the role played by 
social security and pension rules in shaping labor supply decisions and 
analyze the comparative relevance of institutional and individual 
determinants of transitions through the different routes leading to effective 
retirement. For this task we exploit information on the labor market position 
of individuals as well as their health conditions, social and economic  
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environment. When explaining retirement decisions we also use a measure 
of generosity of the pension system (“social security wealth”), defined as 
the discounted sum of expected pension benefits both from social security 
and from private pension schemes, and other determinants which can 
capture preferences about the planning horizon (such as subjective survival 
probability). Such detailed analysis is possible since the SHARE data 
contain all these dimensions of the individuals’ decision framework. 
We find that even after controlling for country indicators (which capture the 
basic institutional variability across countries) all the above determinants 
play a role. Good health conditions have a negative effect on retirement; the 
higher the present value of expected social security benefits relative to 
household resources, the higher the probability of being retired; and the 
higher the subjective survival probability the higher the probability of 
working. 
When assembling all these pieces of the puzzle, a clear picture emerges. 
First, institutions play a very large role in shaping retirement patterns. They 
explain most of the international variation. Second, within each country, i.e. 
given the national institutions, health and subjective survival probability 
explain a substantial share of the remaining within-country heterogeneity of 
retirement patterns. Third, there is no doubt that there is considerable 
“unused capacity” in some countries in which they can tap into if they wish 
to alleviate the strain on their social security systems. 
2. Economic activities of older Europeans: an overview 
The analysis in this paper uses three different concepts of economic activity 
which are important to distinguish. The first concept is self-reported activity 
status. The SHARE questionnaire has each respondent classify herself into 
one of six mutually exclusive labor force states: “worker”, “retired”, 
“unemployed”, “disabled”, “homemaker”, or “other”.
3 Note that we force 
respondents to decide whether they feel themselves e.g. as “retired” rather 
than “working”; there is no option of an in between. 
                                                 
3 This self-reported activity status is coded as variable EP005 in the SHARE data.  
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The second concept is based on the receipt of income. We ask all 
respondents whether they receive labor income (“working”), either from 
employment or self-employment; public transfer payments, including public 
pensions (“retired”), disability benefits (“disabled”), and/or unemployment 
compensation (“unemployed”).
4 We also ask respondents whether they 
receive private pensions, including private early retirement and disability 
pensions.
5 
Finally, the third concept is based on actual working hours. The SHARE 
questionnaire asks every respondent how many hours she actually works.
6 
We use this information to distinguish the states “not working” and “any 
work at all”. In the latter category, we additionally specify the “works more 
than 15 hours” category. 
The three concepts are independent from each other. Of course, many 
respondents will fall in the two conventional categories: (a) self-reported 
working, full time working hours, receipt of labor income and no transfer 
income, or (b) self-reported retired, zero working hours, receipt of a public 
pension and no labor income. But many other combinations are possible, 
e.g. (c) a respondent may receive disability benefits (concept 2), feels retired 
(concept 1), but is working some hours anyway from time to time (concept 
3), or (d) a recipient of unemployment benefits (concept 2) who has been 
unable to find work for some time (concept 3) and therefore feels retired 
(concept 1). This set of three independent concepts therefore permits a 
detailed analysis of the complex and often multi-staged retirement 
transitions in Europe. 
Figure 1 gives a broad impression of the first concept: self-reported activity 
status. The data refer to all respondents of the first wave collected between 
September 2004 and June 2005, encompassing both “age-eligibles” (persons 
born in or before 1954) and their spouses (any age). We focus on workers 
                                                 
4 This information is contained in the SHARE variables EP041, EP045  and EP071. 
5 This information is provided by different categories of EP071. 
6 The answers are coded in variable EP013 in the SHARE data.  
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and retired individuals and group all other categories in the residual 
(“allother”). Two observations catch the eye: First, it is immediately 
apparent that work and retirement are the two prevalent activity states 
reported in the SHARE sample. Second, already at age 61 more SHARE 
respondents classify themselves as retired rather than working. 
Table 1 provides the details behind Figure 1. It lists the distribution of all six 
self-reported activity categories with their standard errors, separately by 
country. The entries are weighted to represent the population aged 50 and 
older using weights provided with the SHARE data set.
7 
Table 1 shows very large differences in the distribution of self-reported 
activities across countries, with the proportion of workers ranging between 
20% (Italy and Austria) and 41% (Switzerland), while the shares of 
individuals reporting to be “retired” range between 36% (the Netherlands 
and Spain) and 62% (Austria). Striking is also the large difference in the 
proportion of respondents classifying themselves as “disabled” which is  1% 
in Italy but more than 8% in the Netherlands. In Denmark, Germany and 
Belgium there are particularly many respondents who classify themselves as 
“unemployed”. This fraction is much lower in Italy and Greece, but also in 
the Netherlands. Finally, there is a surprisingly large variation in the share 
of respondents calling themselves “homemaker”. It is particularly small in 
Sweden (just 1%), very large in Spain (over 32%) and the other 
Mediterranean countries, but also the Netherlands (around 21%) 
These stark differences may have several, not mutually excluding 
explanations. The explanation which interests us most in this paper is that 
pension policies, in particular early retirement regulations, adopted by the 
different countries are an important determinant of labor force participation 
decisions at older ages. Table 1 yields evidence to this hypothesis insofar as 
countries which feature large shares of one early exit route (say, 
unemployment) have low shares of alternative routes to labor force exit 
                                                 
7 Individual weights are contained in the variable WGTACI. See Klevmarken, et al. (2006) for details 
regarding weighting in SHARE.  
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(say, disability). The gender-age stratification in Figure 2 provides some 
additional evidence: less than one out of ten men over 65 report themselves 
as working in all countries (except for Switzerland). Austrians and Italians, 
both men and women, seem to exit the labor force at earlier ages than other 
Europeans. In particular, only 10% of Austrian men between age 60 and age 
64 define themselves as working, compared to almost 60% of Swedish men. 
This is perfectly in line with the applicable statutory retirement ages in the 
two countries. We will provide a more detailed analysis in section 3. 
A second explanation are national customs which may drive the type of self-
reports visible in Table 1. Evidence for this may be the strikingly large 
cross-national variance in the share of “homemakers”. Figure 2 therefore 
also adds the gender dimension. The prevalence of self-reported “working” 
is generally lower for women than for men, mostly because of the relatively 
large fraction of women who report their status as “homemaker”.
8  It is 
highly probable that “homemaker” women never had a labor market 
experience during their lifetime. Section 3 will exploit the other two 
economic activity concepts to better understand potential differences 
between self-reports and hard answers. 
Finally, there are many other personal characteristics which are likely to 
drive retirement behavior. Section 4 focuses on health as a determinant of 
age and pathway of retirement, and section 5 will provide a full description, 
in which all quantifiable characteristics available in the SHARE data are 
simultaneously included. 
3. Partial retirement, unemployment, disability, and other forms of pre-
retirement 
Self-reported activity status could be affected by individual perceptions and 
also by institutional features of the pensions systems. For example in some 
countries individuals may be allowed to work while collecting pension 
benefits (possibly subject to an earnings test) and report themselves retired 
even if working. One could define this situation “partial retirement” and it is 
                                                 
8 A detailed table by gender and age of all activities is available upon request.  
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most likely to occur (where allowed) in the years just preceding full 
retirement.  Tables A1 to A4 in the Appendix report the main institutional 
features of the welfare system which are relevant for the elderly in the 
SHARE countries: it clearly shows the variability of arrangements and 
eligibility conditions that different European citizens face. 
To investigate further the impact of these different arrangements on actual 
choices of workers we exploit the different concepts of “working” but also 
the different concepts of being “retired” or being “disabled”. 
Table 2 shows how self-reported activity status is not uniquely associated to 
a single source of income. Not surprisingly, 90% of Europeans who self-
report as retired receive at least one public or private old-age or early 
retirement pension. But some of them also receive disability benefits or 
labor income. Most respondents who self-report as disabled, receive 
disability benefits (67%). However, one out of ten of those who self-report 
as disabled receives labor income, and a similar fraction receives at least 
one public or private old-age or early retirement pension. One every two 
respondents who self-report as unemployed receive unemployment benefits, 
but one out of five receives labor income from employment or self-
employment. 
Figure 3 compares the three different notions of working. It reports the 
prevalence of the self-reported definition of worker with the definition 
based on receiving labor income and with the definition of “actual worker” 
i.e. having worked even if for a few hours. For all countries receiving labor 
income or doing some hours of work is more prevalent than the 
corresponding self-reported case. This result suggests that although many 
people do not regard themselves as workers they have some “bridge jobs” in 
old age. 
The different panels of Figure 4 show the prevalence of retirement 
according to the first (self-reported activity status) and to the second concept 
(receiving pension income). In Figure 4a, we observe an apparently 
counterintuitive fact that in all countries (apart from the Netherlands) the  
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fraction of recipients is lower than the fraction of self-reported retired.   
However this is because we limit the definition of pension receipt to old age 
or early retirement provisions.
9 Once we allow for survivor’s benefits or 
even for disability benefits the results are reversed (Figures 4b and 4c). This 
evidence simply suggests that the retirement condition is perceived as a 
more general condition than just “being retired from work”: it stresses once 
more the impact that institutions have on economic behavior.   
Figures 5 and 6 perform a similar exercise looking at the unemployment 
condition and the disability condition. The results are striking as there are 
wide cross countries differences between the two concepts: Belgium and the 
Netherlands stick out.  In the former there are many more people collecting 
unemployment benefits than self-reported unemployed (presumably these 
people define themselves retired) while in the latter there are more people 
collecting disability benefits than self-reported disabled.  
To complete the analysis of the working status of older Europeans, in Figure 
7 we make use of actual current work status (concept 3) and distinguish 
workers on the basis of hours worked. We look at both people working “any 
amount of time” and reporting working 15 hours or more per week. In all 
countries, both for women and men, there are more elderly people in paid 
work (actual worker) than self-reported “working”, even when we restrict 
the condition to people with 15 hours or more of work. This is an important 
finding which stresses the need to carefully distinguish between self-
reported activity status and actual employment. Many social surveys use 
self-reported activity status to route respondents into either questions on 
retirement or questions on work; this will miss much of the actual activities 
done by older people. 
Table 3 strengthens this evidence by focusing on the boundary between 
people who report themselves as “working” (either employed or self-
employed) and those self-reporting “retired”. We introduce the category of 
                                                 
9 We take into account both public and private old age pensions and early retirement pensions. War 
pensions,are also included where they apply.  
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people who are “retired but working”. These are respondents who report 
themselves as “retired” according to concept 1 but who have done some 
paid work during the last month as classified by concept 3, as defined in 
Section 2. The share of people that can be considered as “retired but 
working” fluctuates between approximately 1% in Italy and 9% in 
Switzerland. If we use a stricter version of the third concept and define 
“working” as working for at least 15 hours a week, the share basically stays 
the same in Italy, but it declines in Switzerland to about 5%.  Looking at the 
various age classes it emerges that the Scandinavian countries, Germany and 
Austria are characterized by a flexible transition between work and 
retirement. 
If we take a closer look at the four age categories reported in Table 3, then 
we see that the flexible transition extends far into the older ages. Denmark 
sticks out as a country with a particularly high prevalence of “retired but 
working” respondents. Also Austria and Italy have a large share in the older 
age ranges. 
One may think that such flexible transition into retirement is dominated by 
part-time occupations. This is not the case. Table 4 shows that among those 
who work a positive number of hours, there is surprisingly little part time 
work. Perhaps not surprisingly, before age 65, the proportion of 
economically active respondents working part-time is much higher for 
women than for men.  
While partial retirement seems relatively frequent in Switzerland as a whole, 
this is not the case in the youngest age groups: in these age groups, full 
activity remains the rule. In Greece, partial retirement is already 
significantly developed between 50 and 54 for men. These findings suggest 
that in some countries partial or gradual retirement could become an 
important feature of the labor market. 
So far we have combined the first concept of retirement (self-reported 
activity status) with the second concept (labor income) and the third concept 
(working hours). However, even for people who are totally inactive and  
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define themselves “retired”, this does not necessarily correspond to 
retirement in the sense of the second concept (receiving an old-age pension). 
In the different countries, an important role is played by non standard - but 
sometimes dominant - forms of transitions between employment and full 
retirement. These pathways are generally classified in three main categories 
defined by the type of transfer income received: 
  One pathway is unemployment: people are laid-off from their last 
job before being eligible to normal pension benefits. They are 
therefore forced to spend some time in unemployment before being 
considered or considering themselves as retired. 
  A second pathway is sickness or disability insurance. This route 
should only apply to people for whom early exits from the labor 
force result from objective health problems. But some countries have 
also tended to use these benefits as a device for managing general 
cases of “uneasiness” about work or even obsolescence of a worker, 
due for instance to the fact that the skills of an old worker are no 
more recognized or demanded by  employers. 
  Finally, some countries have created pre-retirement schemes. 
Sometimes these are sector-specific (for managing large scale 
redundancies in some declining industries), sometimes these are 
nation-wide programs. 
Figure 8 shows the enormous variability in the prevalence of disability and 
unemployment at older ages, as defined by the self-reported activity status 
(concept 1).
10  Among the Northern countries, the Danish and the Dutch 
cases provide a clear illustration of the substitutability between pathways. 
While in Denmark the prevalence of unemployment is far higher than in the 
other countries (particularly at ages 55-60), the importance of the disability 
route for the Netherlands is a well-known and well-documented aspect of 
the management of older workers in this country: the percentage of disabled 
                                                 
10 The age profiles in Figure 8 are smoothed to remove the sampling variability that is observed in the 
raw data.  
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people in the 60-64 age group peaks to reach almost 20%. The Dutch 
unemployment rate in this group is quite low, one of the lowest in the entire 
sample of countries, and we observe that the share of disabled people drops 
to about 2% around age 65, which is the age at which the majority of Dutch 
people, including the disabled, move to the “retired” category.  
Among the mid-European countries, Germany is a country where 
unemployment is highly relevant as a pathway to retirement, while disability 
is very low – in a striking contrast to the neighboring Netherlands. France 
has a peak in self-reported disability status at early ages (around 56) while 
Switzerland has a late peak (at about age 63). 
In the ages which typically precede retirement, a variety of patterns emerges 
for the southern countries. Disability is almost non existent for Italy and 
Greece before age 60. It remains so also after age 60 in Italy. This may be 
due to the prevalence of early retirement at a very young age: Italy displays 
low or very low rates for both unemployment and disability. In Greece, 
disability increases rather than decreasing at the age where people move into 
retirement: a puzzle to be further investigated. Spain is atypical: the profile 
of unemployment is relatively flat. 
As much as the self-reported activity status did not necessarily correspond 
to the receipt of labor income or hours worked, the self-reported activity 
status shown in Figure 8 does not fully correspond to the receipt of the 
transfer income associated with that status. This holds especially for the 
Nordic countries where self-reported disability status is less frequent than 
the receipt of a disability pension (this was called concept 2 in section 2). 
Figure 9 therefore shows the prevalence of disability insurance benefits 
among respondents between ages 50 and 65.
11 Again, the cross-national 
differences are striking. We can distinguish four country groups. Very high 
enrolment rates exist in Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden. Between 13 
and 16 percent of individuals aged between 50 and 65 receive disability 
                                                 
11 For a precise definition of disability insurance in each SHARE country, see Table A3 in the 
Appendix.  
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insurance benefits in this first group of countries. The second group has 
enrolment rates around the average enrolment rate of 7.5%. This group 
consists of Switzerland and Spain. Here the enrolment ranges from 6 to 
almost 10 percent. Belgium, Germany, France and Italy, the third group, 
have below average enrolment rates between 4 and 6 percent. In Austria and 
Greece less than 3 percent of individuals aged between 50 and 65 receive 
disability insurance benefits. 
The evidence presented so far exhibit a puzzling feature of the European 
welfare state. First, the differences among the three concepts of retirement 
are remarkable. There are cleavages between self-reported activity status 
and actual activities, and, even more impressive, there are large cleavages 
between status and public transfer receipt. Second, the cross-national 
differences among the variants of “the” European welfare state are striking. 
They are very unlikely generated by differences in the underlying socio-
economic and health characteristics of the respondents; rather, these 
different patterns suggest institutional differences and their power to shape 
retirement decisions:
12 depending on national arrangements, access to the 
various pathways may be relatively straightforward, and financially more or 
less attractive also resulting from the labor market configuration and in 
particular from labor demand. 
Eventually, these pathways lead to retirement. Figure 10 shows the 
transitions, defined of self-reported activity status (concept 1).
13 The age 
pattern of retirement shows an interesting regularity. For most countries, 
retirement is about 100% at older ages, say, after age 70. However, this does 
not hold for the Mediterranean countries, Belgium and the Netherlands. 
Theses are the countries with the highest number of respondents who report 
themselves as homemakers (see Table 1). This phenomenon results from the 
                                                 
12 More detailed descriptions of the institutional arrangements that could affect these patterns can be 
found in Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998) or Gruber and Wise (2004). 
13 The age profiles in Figure 10 are smoothed to remove the sampling variability that is observed in 
the raw data.  
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low levels of women’s labor force participation in these countries for the 
relevant cohorts. 
The northern countries show a much steeper retirement increase than the 
southern countries. For Mid-European and Southern countries, the ages at 
transition to retirement differ significantly across countries: the age at which 
50% of the people report themselves as retired is 58 for Austria and 65 for 
Switzerland, 60 for Italy and 65 for Spain. Again, due to the high prevalence 
of “homemaker” status, these ages cannot be exactly interpreted as median 
ages at retirement. For instance, in Spain, the number of people reporting 
themselves as retired stays at 60% between ages 70 and 80. As a 
consequence, the “median” age at retirement should be better defined as the 
age at which one half of these 60% are retired, which takes us closer to 63. 
Nevertheless, it remains that transition into retirement occurs later in Spain 
than in Greece, and later in Greece than in Italy. 
Table 5 turns to the second concept of retirement, namely to the type of 
income that respondents receive, and provides another way to understand 
the total effect of welfare arrangements and labor market configurations on 
exits from the labor market. This table reports the average age of first 
benefit collection among all respondents who currently receive an old age 
pension (including early retirement pensions) or disability benefits (public 
and private sources). Once again, the table shows the remarkable variability 
in the average effective retirement age across countries (for men the lowest 
is Austria at 58.8 and the highest is Denmark at 65). 
4. Retirement age and reasons for retirement: Is there unused capacity? 
A widely held view amongst economists is that there is “unused capacity” 
for active work.
14  While the analysis in the previous sections yields strong 
evidence that institutional factors play a dominant role in shaping retirement 
transitions, this section takes a closer look at health before rushing to 
premature conclusions. Only if bad physical or mental health can be ruled 
                                                 
14 The idea of “unused capacity” has been first elaborated by Gruber and Wise (1999) who argue that 
there is an implicit tax on labor labor providing the incentive to retire early.  
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out as an explanation for high inactivity rates at relatively young ages can 
we speak of “unused capacity”. 
Direct evidence of the reasons for retirement, disaggregated by gender and 
age class, is provided in Table 6, which shows the distribution of “reasons 
for retirement” for the self-reported retirees. The original SHARE question 
provides 9 answer categories that are not mutually exclusive.
15  We have 
regrouped these answers into five major headings: 
(1) “normal” transition due to the fact that people had become eligible 
either for a public or private pension; 
(2) early retirement including undesired early retirement, such as in the 
case of people to whom a early retirement option or a pre-retirement 
has been proposed or imposed (e.g. because of a redundancy); 
(3) retirement due to personal health reasons; 
(4) retirement in order to “enjoy life” or retire at the same time as the 
spouse does; 
(5) all other reasons, including various family or personal reasons. 
The first one of these five motives dominates in the older age classes. 
Striking, however, is the large international variation, particularly in the 
youngest age class. For instance, early retirement is chosen by 66% of Swiss 
males in the 55-59 age range and 50% males in the Netherlands. In Sweden 
and Greece it is less than 11%. At age 65+, eligibility for a pension is 
chosen as a reason for retirement among 86% of Greek and 83% of Spanish 
males, but only by 32% of Dutch males. Health, in turn, is reported by 22% 
of Danish males, 21% of German males and only 8% of Greek males aged 
65+ as a reason to retire. This very large cross-national variation is the role 
of health as a self-reported driver of retirement also extends to women. 
It is notable that the international pattern of health as retirement motive does 
not fit obvious explanations. For instance, it seems natural to find that health 
reasons are less frequently reported in a country like Italy where age at 
                                                 
15  The reasons for retirement are asked in question EP064 of the SHARE questionnaire.  
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retirement is low: since health declines with age, health constraints should 
weigh less in countries where retirement is offered at lower ages.  
The role of health as a main driver of retirement is further put into doubt by 
Figure 11, which shows the distribution of actual work and retirement by 
restricting the attention to individuals in “good health”. Being in “good 
health” is defined on the basis of two indicators: (i) self-reported absence of 
health conditions that limit the ability to work (“healthy”), and (ii) absence 
of any limitation in doing fourteen activities or instrumental activities of 
daily living (ADL and IADL, “functioning”). In order to make the 
comparison sharper we focus on three groups of individuals: those who self-
report as working and are actually currently active; those who self-report as 
retired and have no hours of work (retired); and those who self-report as 
retired but do some hours of work (retired but work). A strikingly high 
frequency of respondents in Austria, France, Italy and Belgium have no 
limitations or are “functioning” on the one hand, but, on the other hand, 
report themselves fully retired. This is true even for people in early 
retirement (i.e., younger than 60). 
Figure 12 turns to what might be considered the clearest case in which 
health should play a major role: receipt of disability insurance benefits (the 
second concept in section 2). Indeed, self-reported health is much worse 
among those who are on disability insurance; see the left panels of Figure 
12. 19.7 percent report poor health among the enrolled, only 2.9 among the 
not enrolled. In turn, only 9.8 percent report excellent or very good health 
among the enrolled, while this share is 42.5 percent among the not enrolled. 
Nonetheless, it is a striking finding that almost 10 percent report excellent or 
very good health in spite of being on disability insurance. 
The health differences, however, are much less pronounced when measured 
more objectively as grip strength. Respondents use a dynamometer which 
they have to press 2 times with each hand; the maximum grip strength 
measured is reported in the right panels of Figure 8. Average grip strength is 
38.1 kilograms among the not enrolled, while individuals on disability  
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insurance have lower grip strength of 34.4 kilograms. Grip strength has a 
fairly large standard deviation (about 13 kilograms) but the difference is 
statistically significant in this large sample.  
The discrepancy between very large self-reported health differences and 
significant but less pronounced differences in the more objective grip 
strength measure may hint at justification bias of self-reported health (Sen, 
2002). Individuals who have enrolled in disability insurance may justify this 
by reporting a lower health status than what can be measured more 
objectively by grip strength. 
These findings are even more disturbing when carried to the country level. 
The left panel of Figure 13 correlates the percentage of respondents aged 
50-64 who are enrolled in disability insurance with the percentage of same 
aged respondents who self-report very good or excellent health. The 
correlation is actually positive: Denmark with a high percentage of 
respondents reporting good health has also the highest share of respondents 
in disability insurance. This perverse correlation vanishes once objective 
health measures are used (such as grip strength and other indicators), see the 
right panel of Figure 13. One would, however, expect a strong negative 
correlation if health were the main driver of receiving disability benefits. 
While health may not be the main concern, respondents quite definitely feel 
relieved when they retire. Evidence is provided by Table 7. It presents 
answers to the question whether retired people have viewed their retirement 
as a positive or a negative event. Retirement is described as a relief by a 
large majority of respondents. Only between 2% and 13% of retired 
respondents see it as an essentially negative experience (“a concern”). This 
is concentrated in the “Club Med” countries: more than 13% of Greek 
retirees, and more than 10% of Spanish and Italian retirees see retirement as 
a concern.  
In conclusion, then, this section suggests the presence of a well-known 
social policy dilemma. In many countries, pathways to early retirement, 
such as pre-retirement schemes, unemployment compensation or disability  
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insurance, are frequently taken. This frequency does not correlate well with 
health. This gives the notion that some countries introduced early-retirement 
institutions that create “unused capacity” much weight. The fiscal and 
economic costs associated with these early-retirement institutions are large 
and pressing. Most early retirees, however, express gratitude for the early 
relief through retirement, an indicator for the large political costs of 
reforming the early-retirement institutions. 
5. Econometric Evidence 
The descriptive evidence of the preceding sections, while suggestive of 
important correlations between early retirement and institutional driving 
forces, does not allow for causal inference. In this section, therefore, we 
carry out multidimensional analyses accounting for various determinants 
simultaneously. We focus on the self-reported activity status (concept 1), in 
particular on the decision to work or retire, in the first subsection, while we 
take a closer look at disability insurance enrolment (concept 2) in subsection 
2. Our main interest is to measure the influence of institutions, and compare 
this with the influence of other potential determinants such as age, gender, 
health, and education. The effect of institutions and labor market 
configuration is captured in several ways. In the analysis of the retirement 
decision, we use country-dummies and a measure of the generosity of the 
social security systems. In the analysis of disability enrolment, we make use 
of a full set of country-specific indicators which characterize the generosity 
of the disability insurance systems. 
5.1. The retirement decision 
In the analysis of the retirement decision, we rely on country dummies to 
pick up all dimensions of country-specific effects that are not captured by 
country-specific differences in all other variables (e.g., health and 
education). The generosity of the social security system is measured through 
the so called “social security and pension wealth” (SSW), defined as the 
present discounted value of expected future benefits from social security 
and pensions, discounted at current age by both a given interest rate and the  
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conditional survival probability. In this definition we include both public 
social security benefits for old age and/or early retirement and private 
pensions.
16  For retirees and inactive people we assume that – in real terms – 
future expected benefits are equal to current benefits. For workers, we 
exploit a question on expected replacement rates at the expected retirement 
age. Hence we project earnings to that age and calculate the first expected 
benefit (pension) and the SSW in turn. In the absence of longitudinal data, 
we cannot measure dynamic incentives of the welfare system, hence this 
variable captures the differential generosity of the system in the different 
countries and for the different groups of workers. The advantage is that it is 
a money-stock measure which is comparable across all individuals of the 
sample. We use the SSW variable in relative terms, i.e., divide it by total 
household income (SSWREL). This is done to control for the fact that SSW 
would pick up the general “economic welfare” of the individual rather than 
the generosity of the pension system to this individual. Total household 
income is a good indicator of resources available to an individual and at the 
same time it does not strictly correlate with her earnings or social security 
benefits. 
The second important explanatory variable is health. Health conditions are 
captured by two indicator variables. They are defined exactly as in the 
preceding section: first, as the self-reported absence of problems hindering 
work, and second as the absence of any among 14 ADL and IADL 
limitations.
17 
Other potential determinants of retirement are age, education, gender, but 
also preferences. We introduce a variable that captures a feature of 
preference which has been proved relevant in studies of retirement-saving, 
                                                 
16 Details on variables construction are provided in a separate Appendix, available upon request. The 
subjective survival probability is described in Borsch-Supan et al. (2005). It is essentially the self-
reported chance of reaching a target age- this is at least 10 years ahead for younger people and it is 
closer for the very old. 
17 Since this paper rests on a single cross-section, we do not attempt to explain the causality between 
health conditions and economic outcomes, i.e. we take current health conditions as given. They may 
affect future economic outcomes, but only with a lag.  
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particularly in the US.
18  This is the “expected life horizon”, which is related 
to the planning horizon of the individual. Some authors also interpret this 
variable as the rate of impatience. In our sample we proxy this variable and 
we rely on specifications making use either of the subjective probability of 
surviving to a target age or of the product of this probability with the length 
of the proposed target lifespan.
19  The former is a simple measure of the 
perceived chance to reach a target age, the latter applies this measure to the 
actual difference between the target age and the current age.  
We relate the probability of being retired to these potential determinants by 
a simple reduced form equation, for which we can provide a latent utility 
interpretation: we assume that the individuals in our sample have compared 
the utility value of working to the utility value of retiring and have chosen 
the activity which generates the highest utility value. Table 8 shows 
estimation results when the outcome variable takes the value 1 for a person 
self-reporting “retired” according to concept 1, and 0 for self-reporting 
“working”. Estimation rests on 13,244 SHARE respondents who are 
working or retired. We exclude “homemaker”, disabled, unemployed and 
“other activities” cases, and restrict the sample to individuals between age 
50 and age 69 because very few respondents are active after age 70. Results, 
based on a probit specification, are shown both in the absence of country-
dummies (first two columns) and including these dummies. The first (and 
the third) column of Table 8 uses the subjective survival probability while 
the second (and the fourth) column include the expected lifespan in the 
specification.  
Health makes a difference. Individuals who are “functioning” are – other 
things being equal – less likely to be retired while the presence of 
limitations in daily activities increases the probability of being retired. The 
other socio-economic characteristics also affect retirement as one might 
                                                 
18 For the studies on saving see for example Gustman and Steinmeier (2000) and Munnell et al 
(1999). The informational content of subjective survival probability has been appraised, among 
others,  by Hurd and McGarry (1997). 
19 It should be noted that for SSW we make use of life tables for the different countries and not of the 
subjective probability of survival.  
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expect. Of special interest may be our preference measures: both the 
subjective survival probability and the expected lifespan have a negative 
effect on such a probability (i.e. the longer the planning horizon the more 
the chance of being a worker).  
The main result, however, is that, even controlling for all these 
characteristics, the variable SSWREL, which captures the generosity of the 
social security and pension system, is significantly and positively associated 
to the retirement probability – i.e. institutions play a significant role. 
Differences in health and other socio-economic characteristics do not 
explain the cross-national variation in activity rates between age 50 and 69. 
One might argue that our generosity variable captures other country 
differences which have nothing to do with benefit generosity. This is not the 
case, see columns 3 and 4, in which we add a set of country-dummies. The 
essential results are unaffected and almost all countries dummies show a 
significant marginal effect, with respect to Germany, chosen as the 
reference country. Compared to Germans, Belgians and also Italians, Greeks 
and Austrians are more likely to be retired.  
We conclude that, over and above general institutional or other differences 
specific to a country, the generosity of the pension system itself matters a 
great deal in making individuals retire or keep on working. 
 
5.2. Enrolment in disability insurance 
The preceding section was based on the concept of “perceived” or self-
reported retirement. In this subsection, we investigate the second concept of 
retirement, namely receipt of a benefit income. As stressed earlier, there are 
many institutions providing benefit income for retirees, and they differ 
across countries, such as public and private old-age pension systems, 
unemployment insurance, disability, incapacity and sickness insurance. This 
subsection focuses on disability insurance. Disability insurance is of 
particular interest in this paper. Figures 12 and 13 displayed a surprisingly  
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small cross-national correlation between health and disability insurance 
enrolment. One interpretation of these findings is that country-specific rules 
and regulations exert a stronger influence on disability insurance uptake 
than the health status of the enrolled individuals. This would constitute a 
remarkable tension between the original aim of disability insurance to cover 
health-related disabilities, and actual health. 
We therefore measure health more extensively than in the previous 
exercises and include a broad set of health measures, ranging from self-
reported health to more objective measurements of the functional physical 
(as above, ADL: activities of daily living, IADL: instrumental activities of 
daily living) and mental health status (CES-D test battery of mental 
health).
20  
To indicate the power of institutions, we make use of previous work by the 
OECD and include a set of variables which characterize the generosity of 
the disability insurance system in each country. These variables measure 
coverage, minimum disability level required for full benefits, benefit 
generosity, medical assessment, vocational assessment, and the generosity 
of unemployment benefits.
21 
In addition, we include similar socio-demographic characteristics (such as 
age, gender, and education) as in the previous estimations. 
We run three regressions: a probit model of being enrolled in disability 
insurance; a Weibull proportional hazards model of the age when an 
individual enrols in disability insurance, and finally a simple linear model 
for the probability to be enrolled into disability insurance. Table 9 presents 
the results in four blocks: demographic variables, health variables, 
institutional variables, and interactions among them. 
A first finding is the similarity among the three specifications. A second 
observation is the large unexplained variation. The (Pseudo-)R
2 in the two 
                                                 
20 SHARE collects EURO-D as depression measure in the main survey and CES-D in the drop off. 
We have used CES-D where available and imputed CES-D from EURO-D where necessary. 
21 These variables are taken from Annex A.2.1 in OECD (2003). 
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probability models is slightly higher than 0.25; a quarter of the individual 
variation in our micro data is not explained in spite of a rich specification of 
health. The duration model has a somewhat lower explanatory power. This 
is in line with the findings of OECD (2003) where only little correlation 
between “medical disability status” and “disability enrolment status” was 
found. 
Demographic variables are jointly significant. Women have a lower 
probability to enrol into disability insurance, conditional on health. Also this 
was a finding of OECD (2003). Older age increases to probability to be 
enrolled until about age 63. We apply a piecewise linear specification, with 
breakpoints at ages 55 and 60. Notable is the sharp increase in the enrolment 
probability between ages 50 and 55. 
All health variables are strongly significant. Noteworthy is the significant 
effect of mental illness, measured by the CES-D battery, conditional on 
physical health, and the strong effect of instrumental activities of daily 
living (IADLs) probably picking up work-related disability. Given these 
functional measures, self-reported health remains highly significant and 
quantitatively large. 
Demographics and health explain, in isolation, about a sixth of the total 
variation of the linear model. This is not much, and corresponds to the 
impression already gained in previous sections and estimates. 
The institutional variables are highly jointly significant. Since they are 
country-specific and thus have much less variation than the micro data, we 
use the “cluster” specification to correct the t-statistics accordingly. All 
measures are scored by the OECD from 0 to 5. Coverage measures on a 0 to 
5 scale which population groups are eligible for insurance. The highest 
score is given if disability insurance covers the entire population; the lowest 
score if only employees are covered. A broad coverage increases disability 
enrolment, but the effect is surprisingly small and insignificant. A lenient 
minimum disability level to claim benefits has more influence on disability 
insurance uptake and is significant in all three specifications. The generosity  
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of benefits is significant, but with an unexpected negative sign, as is the 
disability level required for full benefits. The strictness of a medical exam 
reduces disability uptake. Whether vocational considerations play a role in 
the eligibility process or not is insignificant, as is the permanence of 
benefits. 
The last institutional variable measures the duration and benefit level of 
unemployment compensation, a possible alternative to disability insurance 
as an early retirement device. It is scored 5 for a short duration and lower 
unemployment benefits than disability insurance benefits. Indeed, tight 
unemployment insurance increases disability insurance enrolment in a 
highly significant and quantitatively important way. 
Finally, we also interact the institutional variables with selected 
demographic and health variables. These interactions explain 20.6 percent 
of the total variation in the linear model, thus more than demographics and 
health together. They exhibit some interesting features, especially when 
compared to the institutional variables alone. They explain some of the 
surprising finding discussed above. For example, the surprisingly small 
influence of coverage turns into a very large effect for women and those of 
poor health. The latter is straightforward to explain; the former maybe a 
result of the low labor force participation of European women who have 
difficulties to be eligible for a normal old-age pension and thus may seek 
disability pensions. This corresponds to the very high female enrolment in 
some countries; in Germany, a lenient eligibility to disability insurance for 
women was explicitly a policy instrument in the early 1980s. 
Another example for the importance of interaction effects is the generosity 
variable, which carries an unexpected negative sign in the overall 
regression, but is strongly positive for the older part of the sample (age 60 
and over). 
The regression results of Table 9 are somewhat abstract. They receive some 
life in the following exercise: we predict in a counterfactual simulation 
exercise which share of our sample individuals would take up disability  
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insurance if all countries had the same demographic composition, the same 
distribution of health, and/or the same institutional characteristics as the 
average of the SHARE countries. By counterfactually wiping out one kind 
of difference among countries, we can graphically display the influence of 
the variable having created those differences in the first place. Take the 
example of health. If health were the main driver of disability insurance 
enrolment, making health counterfactually equal across all countries should 
also make disability insurance enrolment rates close to equal in all 
countries. 
The results of this exercise are striking, see Figure 14. The counterfactual 
simulation holding eligibility and benefit generosity indicators constant 
produces much more similar disability uptake rates than holding 
demographics and health constant. The only outlier is Switzerland, where 
uptake rates would be extremely low under average generosity. 
A simple “back-of-the-envelope” regression confirms the above results. 
Regressing the aggregate enrolment rates in the small sample of 13 
countries on five of the above indicator variables (coverage, minimum 
disability level required, benefit generosity, medical assessment, vocational 
assessment) yields an R-squared of 89% (adjusted 78%) and highly 
significant coefficients. Hence, more than three quarters of the cross-
national variation in enrolment rates can be explained by the institutional 
factors embedded in the five OECD indicators.  
6. Conclusions 
The variation in retirement behavior, old-age labor force participation and 
disability insurance take-up rates across European countries is striking. In 
Austria and Italy, the age at which a normal pension is first received is about 
6 years earlier than in Denmark and Sweden. In turn, disability insurance 
enrolment reaches from some 15 percent of individuals aged between 50 
and 64 in Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands to less than 3 percent in 
Austria and Greece. There is clearly substitution among pathways to 
retirement, but also an overall effect on labor force participation: In Sweden,  
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Denmark and Switzerland, almost 40% of individuals aged 50+ classify 
themselves as working, while only about 20% do this in Italy and Austria. 
While health is an important determinant of earlier retirement, it does not 
explain the large cross-national variation. This is explained by institutional 
differences in welfare systems, which clearly affect the distribution and the 
age pattern of participation to the labor market and of retirement. Countries 
where early retirement is allowed and/or is generous see a prevalence of 
early retirees (typically Southern countries, but also Austria and France). 
Furthermore, in countries where other exit routes are allowed as form of 
early retirement (disability and unemployment) these substitute for 
retirement. The most influential institutional variable to explain disability 
enrolment is the minimum level of disability to obtain full benefits. This 
variable alone explains more than 60% of the cross-national variation. It 
seems to be the most powerful policy variable when countries such as the 
Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden want to bring their disability insurance 
enrolment rates closer to the average European level. 
There is potentially huge unused labor capacity in countries such as Austria, 
Italy and France where “healthy” individuals are not in the labor force. 
Econometric evidence corroborates the early findings: even controlling for 
health characteristics, age, gender and country effects, the generosity of the 
social security and pensions systems helps explaining the pattern of 
retirement (or disability) vis-à-vis work. 
The social policy implications are clear. If Europeans want to reduce the 
already high tax and contribution burdens in the light of population aging, 
they should exploit the unused capacity of individuals who self-report to 
enjoy a good functional health status. The current retirement institutions 
provide generous early retirement options, partially through lenient 
disability and unemployment insurance rules. Employers and employees 
cannot be blamed taking these options up, even if the workers are happy and 
healthy. Rather, it is the task of politicians and lawmakers to align 
institutions with the necessity to make our social security systems more  
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sustainable: to align early retirement ages with an increased life expectancy, 
to adapt disability insurance to actual functional disability, and to devote 
unemployment insurance to those who are temporarily out of work and 
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Source: Authors' calculations using SHARE 2004. Population-weighted data. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of economically active individuals by gender, age 
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Source: Authors' calculations using SHARE 2004. Population-weighted data. 
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Figure 4: Different concepts of economic activity: Retiree 
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Figure 4: Different concepts of economic activity: Retiree (continued) 
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Source: Authors' calculations using SHARE 2004. Population-weighted data. 
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Source: Authors' calculations using SHARE 2004. Population-weighted data. 
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Source: Authors' calculations using SHARE 2004. Population-weighted data. 
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Figure 7: Distribution of self-reported and actual economic activity by 
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Source: Authors' calculations using SHARE 2004. Age 50-65. Population-
weighted data.  
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Figure 11: Economic activity and physical health 
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Figure 12: Health by disability insurance enrolment, across all countries 
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Source: Authors' calculations using SHARE 2004. Population-weighted data.  
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Figure 13: Health and disability insurance enrolment, by country 
 











































Source: Authors' calculations using SHARE 2004.  
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Note: Based on linear regression specification in Table 9.  
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Table 1: Self-reported labor market status by country 
 
 



























































































































































Source: Authors' calculations using SHARE 2004. Based on a sample of 27,152 
individual 50+ respondents who reported their current situation. Percentage values. 
Standard errors in parentheses. All figures, except for sample sizes, are population-
weighted.  
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Table 2: Self-reported economic activity and income receipt 
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Source: Authors' calculations using SHARE 2004. Based on a sample of 27,100 individual 50+ 
respondents who reported their current situation. Percentage values. Standard errors in 
parentheses. All figures, except for sample sizes, are population-weighted  
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Table 3: Percentage of workers and retired by age classes, country and job situation 
 
    SE DK DE NL BE FR CH AT ES  IT GR 
  
All ages 
Worker  only  38.9 38.0 28.5 30.3 22.2 27.5 40.7 21.4 19.7 22.9 24.9 
Retired  but  work  (any  hrs)  3.8 3.8 2.8 1.5 1.6 0.8 8.7 4.6 3.0 1.2 4.4 
Retired  but  work  (>15  hrs)  1.6 0.9 1.2 0.6 0.8 0.5 4.6 3.5 1.9 0.8 1.6 
Retired  only  51.0 48.8 50.8 34.5 50.9 54.3 36.7 57.8 52.5 35.2 41.1 
               
   Age 50-54 
Worker  only  85.2 81.1 75.6 71.2 71.3 75.9 81.7 70.6 61.7 60.1 64.5 
Retired  but  work  (any  hrs)  0.8 0.8 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.5 1.6 2.1 0.3 1.7 
Retired  but  work  (>15  hrs)  0.6 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.5 1.2 1.2 0.3 0.7 
Retired  only  4.5 6.0 1.2 0.0 4.4 2.3 0.0 8.8 7.4 4.9 6.3 
   Age 55-59 
Worker  only  76.5 70.8 64.1 56.9 43.5 59.1 73.6 41.2 38.1 50.7 51.8 
Retired  but  work  (any  hrs)  1.3 0.9 0.7 1.1 0.7 0.8 1.3 5.3 2.0 0.8 3.7 
Retired  but  work  (>15  hrs)  0.5 0.3 0.1 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.6 5.0 1.4 0.5 1.7 
Retired  only  10.6 7.9  5.6  3.3 18.3  15.5 1.0 30.8  27.8 9.3 18.2 
   Age 60-64 
Worker  only  56.9 34.6 23.9 19.3 15.9 18.4 47.7  6.7  13.5 23.2 28.8 
Retired  but  work  (any  hrs)  3.0 7.5 5.1 2.7 2.3 2.0 5.6 5.6 5.6 1.1 4.3 
Retired  but  work  (>15  hrs)  1.3 1.7 2.4 1.3 1.2 1.0 2.1 4.1 3.3 0.6 1.5 
Retired  only  27.5 50.4 46.9 29.4 53.2 60.7 24.2 76.0 59.4 29.0 31.8 
   Age 65-70 
Worker  only  6.7 8.0 4.4 2.1 1.8 1.3  14.9  2.7 7.4 4.3 4.9 
Retired but work (any hrs)  12.1  11.9  5.5  2.9  2.2  1.0  23.5  7.4  4.6  1.6  7.9 
Retired  but  work  (>15  hrs)  4.9 2.8 2.3 0.9 0.6 0.5  10.0  3.5 3.4 0.9 3.6 
Retired  only  80.7 73.0 82.7 67.0 78.1 86.6 53.1 78.5 70.0 57.8 62.8 
Source: Authors' calculations using SHARE 2004.  Based on a sample of 27,152 individual 50-69 respondents 
who reported their current situation. Percentage values. Respondents are classified as retired but working 15 
hours or more if they self-report as retired and they report at least 15 hours of work in the last week in which 
they worked. All figures, except for sample sizes, are population-weighted 
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Table 4: Distribution of economically active individuals between full-time and part-time 
by gender, country and age 
 
WOMEN 
  SE DK DE NL BE FR CH  AT  IT  ES GR 
A G E   5 0 - 5 4                
full  time  76.3 74.8 64.9 46.4 54.7 77.2 52.8  67.5  65.6 79.8 59.0 
part  time  23.7 25.2 35.1 53.6 45.3 22.8 47.2  32.5  34.4 20.2 41.0 
               
A G E   5 5 - 5 9                
full  time  77.3 78.1 59.6 38.2 43.8 64.2 44.8  68.2  45.8 73.4 60.5 
part  time  22.8 21.9 40.4 61.8 56.2 35.8 55.2  31.8  54.2 26.6 39.5 
               
A G E   6 0 - 6 4                
full  time  64.3 68.1 53.6 27.0 50.8 70.9 46.1  57.1  57.8 67.8 61.7 
part  time  35.7 31.9 46.4 73.0 49.2 29.1 53.9  42.9  42.2 32.2 38.4 
               
MEN 
  SE DK DE NL BE FR CH  AT  IT  ES GR 
A G E   5 0 - 5 4                
full  time  95.4 97.3 94.1 92.6 88.4 92.9 82.8 100.0 81.6 89.7 72.6 
part  time  4.6 2.7 5.9 7.4  11.6  7.1  17.2 0.0 18.4  10.3  27.4 
               
A G E   5 5 - 5 9                
full  time  93.5 91.2 98.2 87.6 89.4 94.8 89.1  91.8  86.3 89.4 71.6 
part  time  6.5  8.8  1.8 12.4  10.6 5.2 10.9  8.2  13.7  10.6  28.5 
               
A G E   6 0 - 6 4                
full  time  85.3 90.9 98.9 69.2 76.9 87.4 87.1  83.3  83.6 78.5 72.0 
part  time  14.7  9.1  1.1  30.8 23.1 12.6 12.9  16.7  16.4 21.5 28.0 
Source: Authors' calculations using SHARE 2004.  Based on sample of 7,161 individual 50-64 respondents 
who reported working. Percentage values. Respondents are classified as full time if. they work 30 hours or 
more. All figures, except for sample sizes, are population-weighted 
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Table 5: Average age when receiving a pension for the first time, by gender and country 
 
 
               
   SE DK DE NL BE FR CH AT IT  ES GR 
  
FEMALE 
Public and private old 
age and early 
retirement pensions 




54.6 49.6 50.3 45.9 48.2 48.0 48.3 53.3 52.4 51.5 52.5 
  
MALE 
Public and private old 
age and early 
retirement pensions 




56.6 49.5 51.8 47.4 49.2 47.1 56.0 50.8 52.2 50.1 52.7 
Source: Authors' calculations using SHARE 2004. Public and private old age and early retirement pensions age 
based on a sample of 9900 individuals. Disability and invalidity/incapacity pensions age based on a sample of 
1102 individuals. All figures, except for sample sizes, are population-weighted.  
 53
 
Table 6: Reasons for retirement by gender and country 
 
 
 WOMEN   
    SE  DK  DE  NL  BE FR CH AT IT ES  GR 
 Age  55-59   
Eligible  0.0 0.0 7.4 0.0 9.9  61.1  51.4  66.2  65.0  17.1 39.9 
Early-preretirement  7.9  20.2 50.3 39.9 19.7 13.0  48.6  9.5  10.8  0.0  25.4 
Health-problems  92.2  74.8  21.4 0.0 21.4 5.3  0.0  18.9  26.5  69.5  7.4 
Enjoy  life  0.0 5.0 7.4 0.0  10.6  15.1 0.0  2.7  10.8  0.0  24.9 
Other    2.2 0.0  10.3  60.1  9.2 9.3  0.0  1.4 6.7 0.0  0.0 
   Age 60-64   
Eligible  4.0  15.5 45.1 13.2 32.9 44.1  68.7  66.9 70.7  4.3  59.3 
Early-preretirement  20.1 29.1 31.9 31.6 20.4 21.0  15.5  12.2  6.4  28.3  12.3 
Health-problems  63.5 41.3 14.1  7.9  20.2 16.2  5.4  14.0  5.4  43.3  11.0 
Enjoy  life  11.3  22.3 6.9  5.3 12.6 9.9  10.4  8.7 13.3 2.8  10.3 
Other    3.0 2.0  12.1  13.3  11.5  12.0 0.0  1.8 3.2 0.0  5.5 
   Age 65+   
Eligible  54.5 44.3 59.3 30.0 36.1 48.0  66.8  65.4 67.6 53.6  69.8 
Early-preretirement  14.3 17.6 11.0 15.9 13.6 10.1  2.6  4.3  3.6  7.4  4.2 
Health-problems  23.2 17.2 12.4 11.5 13.6 11.0  6.0  15.9 15.1 22.0  11.1 
Enjoy  life  5.9  16.5 12.6 15.1 19.0 18.1  7.2  10.9 14.6  5.0  7.8 
Other    7.4  5.5  13.0 26.9 17.2 14.4  15.6  2.3  2.2  4.8  3.6 
                
 MEN   
   SE  DK DE NL BE FR CH  AT  ES  IT GR 
  Age 55-59    
Eligible  5.7  0.0 5.8 15.4 9.5 52.4 100.0 30.8 66.5 22.8 69.1
Early-preretirement  10.8 23.5 43.7 50.0 39.2 36.1 66.7 23.1 14.2 18.4 9.6
Health-problems  67.3 69.7 52.5 0.0 7.4 8.5 0.0 46.2 16.1 36.3 14.2
Enjoy  life  5.4 0.0 5.8 7.7 1.0 10.1 0.0 2.6 4.1 0.0 7.1
Other    3.2 0.0 12.1 5.3 6.4 5.7 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0
   Age 60-64    
Eligible  12.8 27.1 27.6 20.2 34.5 60.4 30.1 57.6 78.9 19.3 73.6
Early-preretirement  41.4 38.0 42.0 38.8 35.1 19.4 31.9 16.7  9.3 35.9 12.3
Health-problems  42.4 33.5 30.6 5.0 8.4 16.6 4.3 28.5  6.9 33.8 7.3
Enjoy  life  4.7  16.8 1.4 2.9 6.3 0.8 17.4 2.1 2.9 2.5 2.2
Other    13.0 3.1 2.8 12.7 6.8 12.0 17.8 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0
   Age 65+    
Eligible  52.4 43.8 57.5 31.4 46.9 63.7 65.4 76.0 82.9 60.6 86.3
Early-preretirement 22.3  31.6 24.0 41.8 29.3 21.0 15.2  6.6  6.0  18.4 1.8
Health-problems  18.7 22.7 21.3 14.1 14.1 11.0 8.5 17.5  9.7 14.9 8.4
Enjoy  life  3.5  13.7 1.2 3.9 2.6 2.0 7.9 0.9 2.6 2.1 0.8
Other    4.8 2.0 5.2 12.6 7.5 7.1 8.2 0.4 0.8 1.9 0.5
Source: Authors' calculations using SHARE 2004. Percentages. Multiple answers possible, thus percentages do 













































































































Source: Authors' calculations using SHARE 2004. Percentages. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Based on a sample of 13,150 retired individuals. All figures, except 
for sample sizes, are population-weighted. 
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Table 8: Probit Estimates of the Decision to Retire - Marginal Effects  
   (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
 
               
Respondent is male  -0.022 -0.022 -0.034  -0.033   
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)  (0.013)   
(Age/10) -1.167 -1.418 -1.313  -1.495   
 (0.343) (0.335) (0.369)  (0.363)   
(Age/10) squared  0.175 0.192 0.192  0.204   
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.031)  (0.031)   
Respondent is married  -0.008 -0.008 0.021  0.021   
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)  (0.017)   
Years of schooling  -0.016 -0.016 -0.014  -0.014   
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.002)   
No functional limitation  -0.076 -0.077 -0.103  -0.103   
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)  (0.014)   
IADL-limited 0.112 0.113 0.122  0.123   
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.024)  (0.024)   
Subjective survival probability  -0.145 -0.106     
 (0.024) (0.026)     
Subjective lifespan  -0.008   -0.006   
 (0.001)   (0.002)   
SSWrel 0.027 0.026 0.021  0.020   
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.012)  (0.012)   
         
SE     -0.199  -0.199   
     (0.023)  (0.023)   
DK     -0.095  -0.096   
     (0.028)  (0.028)   
NL     -0.084  -0.085   
     (0.025)  (0.024)   
BE     0.139  0.139   
     (0.023)  (0.023)   
FR     0.094  0.095   
     (0.024)  (0.024)   
CH     -0.257  -0.257   
     (0.030)  (0.030)   
AT     0.309  0.309   
     (0.020)  (0.020)   
IT     0.207  0.207   
     (0.026)  (0.026)   
ES     -0.122  -0.123   
     (0.035)  (0.035)   
GR     0.074  0.074   
     (0.029)  (0.029)   
         
Mean of dependent variable  0.487 0.487 0.487  0.487   
Number of observations  13244 13244 13244  13244   
         
Based on sample of respondents who reported to be working or retired.     




Table 9 : Regression results disability insurance enrolment 
 Probit  Z  Weibull  z  Linear  T 
Female  -0.661 -1.91 0.430 -1.71 -0.078 -1.39 
Age<55  -1.068 -0.58 2.602  0.19 -0.094 -0.31 
Age>60  0.385  0.1 12.949  0.49 0.123 0.25 
Age-lin1  0.027 2.05 0.940 -1.84 0.003 2.29 
Age-lin2  0.006 0.15 0.955 -0.56 0.001 0.12 
Age-lin3  -0.006 -0.09 0.960 -0.45 -0.002 -0.22 
        
SRH-excellent  -0.896 -6.86 0.141 -8.14 -0.063 -2.62 
SRH-very  good  -0.534 -4.28 0.324  -7.5  -0.041 -2.15 
SRH-fair  -0.007 -0.06 1.417  0.68 -0.192 -4.73 
SRH-poor  0.361 2.49 2.206 1.55 -0.078  -1.53 
CES-D  (sum)  0.058 4.88 1.087 4.33 0.008 2.84 
ADL  (sum) 0.054 1.33 1.052 1.04 0.022  1.9 
IADL  (sum)  0.221 4.6 1.257  4.42  0.061 3.7 
        
Coverage  0.039 0.68 1.320 1.96 -0.023  -2.19 
Min.  benefits  0.361 4.39 1.992 3.09 0.036 2.39 
Full  benefits  -0.184 -2.18 0.616 -2.87 0.003 0.26 
Generosity  -0.329 -5.03 0.546 -2.71 -0.028 -3.12 
Permanent  0.049 1.87 1.175 2.59 -0.006  -0.81 
Medical  0.069 2.71 1.106 1.46 0.006  1.4 
Vocational  -0.121 -1.79 0.943 -0.31 -0.040 -3.29 
UI-Benefits  0.106 4.02 1.120  1.3  0.022 3.02 
        
covg_fem  0.205 4.87 1.447 4.46 0.027 3.18 
minl_fem  0.015 0.15 1.025 0.14 0.000 -0.03 
Full_fem  -0.086 -1.17 0.810 -1.71 -0.005 -0.52 
geno_fem  -0.018 -0.23 0.908 -0.53 -0.002 -0.2 
covg_old  -0.032 -0.92 0.922 -0.99 0.000  0 
minl_old  -0.118 -1.65 0.819 -1.08 -0.003 -0.37 
full_old  -0.048 -1.12 0.882 -1.25 -0.010 -1.94 
geno_old  0.173 2.72 1.353  1.6  0.011 1.32 
covg_hfpoor  0.110 5.27 1.008 0.09 0.078  14.63 
minl_hfpoor  0.091 2.12 0.918 -0.45 0.072 7.95 
full_hfpoor 0.063 1.32 1.430 2.67 -0.024  -2.88 
geno_hfpoor  -0.036 -0.95 1.111  0.53 -0.030 -7.68 
        
Constant  -1.827 -0.71 1.256 35.76 0.182  0.49 
(Pseudo-)R2  0.2588  0.1957  0.2667 




Table A1: Features of the old age and early retirement provisions 
Countries  Staturory old-age  Eligibility rule  Early 
retirement 
age 
Contribution Benefit  Min  e  max 
Male 65  61.5  Employee  10,25%  of 
earnings 
Regular  Benefit accrues at 2% of base




Age + 180 months 
of insurance 
coverage in last 30 
years, or 300 
months of 
insurance or 180 of 
contributions 




Reduction of 3% per year up to a max of 10,5%  Max 
  
Male 65  60  Employee  7,5%  of 
earnings 
Regular  60% of average life-time earnings (75% for married couples)   Min    9,253.11 
euros a year 
(single), 
11,562.55 




Age   




1310 CZK (base) + 1,5% of PAB
(6) per year of insurance  Max  38,678.50 
euros a year 
Male 62  59  Employee  6,5%  of 
earnings 
Regular  Reduction of 0.9% /every 90-day period preceding the normal retirement age  Min    2,080 CZK  Czech Republic 
Female 56-60* 
Age 
53-57*  Employer  21,5% of  
payroll 
Early 
retirement    
Max    
Male 65  60-66  Employee  None  (2)  Regular  Universal pension (4,512 DKK/month) ATP and SP (Labor market supplementary 
pension) depend on contribution's record  




Age + 3 to 40 years 
of residence (public 
pension); age + 
years of 
contributions (ATP 
and SP)  60-66 Employer  None  (2)  Early 
retirement 
Partial retirement (work for 12 hours/week) : max 86,892 DKK per year  Max 
  
France  Male  60  Age + 1/4 of 
insurance coverage.
   Employee  6,55% of 
insurable 
earnings 
Regular  25% to 50% of the average salary in the best 11-24 years
(7)  Min    6,307.62 
euros a year  
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Max 50%  of 
max 
earnings 
Male 65  59-63  Employee  9,75%  of 
earnings 
Regular  Individual earning points
(8) x 1.0 (pension factor) x pension value (monthly benefit 
amount for 1 year's average earnings, adjusted for changes in wages) 




Age + 5 years of 
contributions 




Reduction of the pension factor of 0.003/calendar month before 65 years of age  Max 
  




Regular  30-70% of average earnings during the last 5 years (varying inversely with 
earnings level) + 1% of earnings/300 days of contribution between 3300 and 7800 
+ 1,5-2,5%/300 days beyond 7800 




Age + 4,500 days 
of contributions; 
Age 62/57 + 10,000 
days of 
contributions; Age 
58 + 10,500 days of 
contributions; 
11,100 days of 
contributions 






reduction of 0,5% for each month of early retirement  Max    









Age + 260 weeks of 
paid contributions 
(started before age 
56 and with year 
average of 48 
weeks). 
55-64 Employer  8,5-
10,75%










57 Employee  8,89%  of 
earnings 
Regular  Newly insured (after 1st January 1996): 33% of taxable base income x age-dep. 
coefficient (4.72-6.136); <18 years of contributions at 1st January 1996: 0.9-2% of 
salary x years of contribution (for period pre 1/1/1996) and as newly insured for 
period after 1/1/96; >18 years of contribution: 0.9-2% of salary x years of 
contribution. 








   Max    
Netherlands  Male  65  Age + 50 years of 
residence and 
   Employee  17,9% of 
earnings 
Regular  single: 859.24 euro; couple (both aged 65 or more): 598.07 each; single with child 
(less the 18): 1.077,54 
Min   
   
  59
Female 65  contributions  paid 
(if income earners) 
each year between 
age 15 and 64. 
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Male  65     Employee  9,76% of 
current gross 
salary 
Regular  24% of average national salary; 1,3% of the workers earnings base
(9) x 
contribution years; 0,7% of workers earnings base x credit years 





Age + 25 years of 
insurance (men) ; 
Age + 20 years of 
insurance (women). 
   Employer  9,76% of  
payroll 
Early 
retirement    
Max    
Male 65  61  Employee  4,7%  of 
covered 
earnings 
Regular  50% of benefit for first 15 years+0,3%/each year between the 16-25 years of 
contributions+2%/each year after the 26th up to a max of 100%. 










Age + 15 years of 
contributions (at 
least 2 in the last 15 
years). 





Reduction between 6-8% (depending on years of contribution) for each year less 





Male 65  61-64  Employee  7%  of 
assessable 
income 
Regular  Total accrued divided by (annual index based on average wages reported to 
pension system + annuity factor depending on life expectancy and expected 
increase of average wage) 
Min       Sweden 
Female 65 
Age + 3 years of 
coverage (earning-
related); age + 3 
years of residence 
(public). 





Max 7.5  times 
base 
amount 
Male  65     Employee  4,2% of   
income 
Regular  Base pension: average annual income < 37.080 francs: 9,146 + (annual income x 
13/600); average annual income>37.080 francs: 12.854 + (annual income x 8/600). 
Mandatory occupational pension: 7.2% of accumulated funds 





Age + contributions 
from age 21. 
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Notes to Table A1 
 
*According to the number of children raised; (1) Depending on years of contribution; (2) Covered by income tax; (3) If in a harduous or unhealty job; (4) Depending on weekly earnings; (5) Revalued average earnings in best 15 
years up to max 2,886.14/year; (6) Personal Assessment Base (PAB): average gross earnings over the last 30 years; the monthly earnings are variably included depending on their amount; (7) Depending on the year of birth; (8) 
Individual's annual eanings divided by the average earnings of all contributors multiplied the pension factor (1.0); (9) Workers earnings base=average monthly earnings from 10 consecutive years chosen by the applicant among 






















Table A2: Features of the unemployment provisions 
Countries  Qualifying conditions  Contributions  Benefit  Min e max 
Employer  3% of earnings  Min    4.08 euros per day 
Employee  3% of payroll 
Austria  28 weeks of contributions in the last 
12 months (52 weeks in the last 24 
months if first claim), registered at 
the employment office, capable of 
and willing to work. 
Government any  deficit 
55% of net earnings. Payable for 
up to 20 weeks (extendable to 30 
to 78 weeks depending on certain 
conditions of age and 
contributions) 
Max  33.82 euros per day 
Employer  0,87% of earnings  Min      
Employee  1,46% of earnings 
Belgium  312 days of insured employment or 
deemed employment in the last 18 
months (<36 years old), 468 days in 
the last 27 months (36 to 50), 624 
days in the last 36 months (over 50), 
registration at the employment 
office, capable of and willing to 
work. 
Government any  deficit 
60% for all period (household 
head), 60% 1st year and 44% 
thereafter (single person living 
alone), 55% 1st year and 35% 
thereafer (single person living 
with other people) 
Max  58.83 euros per day 
Employer  0,4% of earnings  Min      
Employee  3,2% of payroll 
Czech Republic  Registered with the Labor Offices as 
looking for work, employment for at 
least 12 months in the past 3 years. 
Government any  deficit 
50% of eanings during the first 3 
months, 40% the next 3 months; 
60% in case of retraining 




   
  
    
Employer Membership 
contribution to the 
unemployment fund 
+ 8% of the gross 
income toward the 
Labor Market fund. 
Min      
Employee  3% value-added tax 
base of the enterprise 
Denmark  Membership in a unemployment 
fund during the last 12 months and 
52 weeks of employment in the last 
3 years, capable of and willing to 
work. 
Government  any cost above 
employer/employee 
contributions 
90% of the average earnings of 
the preceding 12 weeks. Benefit 
payable from the 1st day up to 1 
year (job seeking period), this 
period may be followed by 
another 3 years period 
Max  604 DKK a day 
(157,040 DKK a year) 
Employer 2%  of  monthly 
earnings 
Min      
Employee  3,60% of payroll 
France  <60 years of age (between 60 and 
65 if without enough required 
quarter of coverage for old-age 
pension), 4 months of work during 
the last 18 months, resident in 
France, registered at the 
employment office, capable of and 
willing to work. 
Government  Total cost of 
solidarity program 
57,4% and 75% of the daily 
reference wage. The duration of 
benefit varies according to age (4 
to 30 months if <50, 5 to 60 
months if >50)  Max    
Employer  3,25% of covered 
earnings 
Min      
Employee  3,25% of covered 
earnings 
Germany  Personally registered at employment 
office, capable of and willing to 
work, 360 days of insured 
employment in the last 3 years. 
Government any  deficit 
67% of net earnings for 
unemployed with children (60% if 
no children). Benefit payable for 
180 to 960 calendar days 
according to the lenght of insured 
employment and age. 
Max     
  64
Employer  1,33% of earnings  Min    9,94 euros per day 
Employee  2,67% of payroll 
Greece  125 days of contributions in the last 
14 months (or 200 days in the last 2 
years), capable of and willing to 
work, registered at the employment 
office. 
Government none 
40% of wages or 50% of salary. 
Benefit payable after a 6-day 
waiting period for 125 days of 
employment for up to 5 months, 
150 days up to 6 months, 250 
days up to 8 months, 220 days up 
to 10 months, 250 days if >49, 
210 days up to 12 months. 
Max    
Employer  See old-age pension  Min      
Employee  See old-age pension 
Ireland  Age 16 to 65, unemployed for at 
least 3 days in 6 consecutive days, 
39 week of paid contributions, 
capabel of and willing to work, 
registered at Social Welfare Local 
Office. 
Government Any  deficit 
118,80/week payable for up to 15 
months (156 days if <18 and 156 
weeks if >=65) 
Max  118.80 euros a week 
Employer  None  Min      
Employee  1,61% to 1,91% of 
payroll 
Italy  2 years coverage with 52 weeks of 
contributions in the last 2 years. 
Mobility allowance: industrial 
workers, 1 year of insurance, 6 
months of employment, registered at 
the employment office, capable of 
and willing to work 
Government Administrative  costs 
40% of salary payable for up to 
180 days (270 for workers >50) 
(private sector workers). Mobility 
allowance: for first 12 months 
100% of benefit, thereafter 80%, 
payable up to 48 months. 
Max    
Employer  None  Min      
Employee None 
The Netherlands  26 weeks of employment in the last 
39 weeks (basic benefit), 52 days in 
4 years of the 5 preceding years 
(salary related benefit) 
Government Total  cost 
70% of the minimum wage (basic 
benefit), 70% of the last salary 
(salary related benefit) 
Max     
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Employer  None  Min      
Employee  3% of payroll 
Poland  Registered with the employment 
bureau, 180 days of employment in 
the past year, have complete 
education, newly released from the 
military service, completed 
maternity leave, or been released 
from prison. 
Government any  deficit 
Base amount for workers between 
5 and 20 years of employment, 
80% of base amount if <5 years, 
120% if >20 years. Benefit 
payable for 6 to 18 months  Max    





Min    75% of the minimum 
wage, 100% of the 
minimum 
interprofessional salary 




7,7%(part time or 
TWA jobs). 
Spain  12 months of contributions during 
the last 6 years, registration at the 
employment office. 
Government Variables  subsidies 
70% of average earnings during 
the last 6 months for up to 180 
days, 60% after 180 days. 
Max  170% of the minimum 
interprofessional salary 
Employer  None  Min      
Employee None 
Sweden  Unemployed, registered as 
jobseekers at the public employment 
service, able and willing to accept a 
suitable job for at least 3 hours/day 
(17 hours a week).  
Government  93% of cost through 
appropriation 
270 kronor per day (basic 
unemployment benefit). Payable 
up to 300 days per unemployment 
spell 
Max     
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Employer  1,5% of earnings  Min      
Employee  1,5% of payroll 
Switzerland  Live in Switzerland, 6 months of 
employment in the last 2 years, 
willing and able to work, report 
once a month to unemployment 
office. 
Government cover  deficit 
80% of the last earnings (if 
dependents, low income, 
disabled), 70% for all other. 
Benefit payable after 5-days 
waiting period  Max    
Notes to Table A2:            
In all countries unemployment is not due to voluntary departure without good reason, misconduct, work stoppage or refusal of suitable job.    
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Table A3: Disability insurance schemes considered 
 
Austria (AT)  Staatliche Invaliditätspension 
Belgium (BE)  Assurance invalidité légale/Wettelijke uitkering wegens arbeidsongeval of beroeps-
ziekte; Pension de maladie, d'invalidité, maladie professionnelle/Wettelijke uitkering 
wegens ziekte of invaliditeit of tegemoetkoming aan personen met een handicap 
Switzerland (CH)  Invalidenrente aus IV, assurance invalidité légale (AI) and Rendità invalidità (AI) 
Germany (DE)  Erwerbsminderungsrente and Beamtenpension wegen Dienstunfähigkeit 
Denmark (DK)  Offentlig sygedagpenge and offentlig førtidspension  
Spain (ES)  Pensión pública contributiva y no contributiva de invalidez/incapacidad  
France (FR)  Prestation publique d’invalidité (AAH, APA) 
Greece (GR)  Σύνταξη αναπηρίας 
Italy (IT)  Assicurazione  pubblica di disabilità (anche assegno di accompagnamento)” and 
pnsione pubblica di invalidità o di inabilità 
Netherlands  (NL)  WAO, Waz of invaliditeitspensioen and Algemene bijstandswet (Abw), 
IOAW/IOAZ, aanvullende bijstandsuitkering, Toeslagenwet (TW) 
Sweden (SE)  Förtidspension (sjukersättning), yrkesskadepension, and sjukbidrag 
England (UK)  Incapacity benefits (previously invalidity benefits) 
United States (US)  SSDI and SSI disability pension 
   Disability insurance is defined as all branches of publicly financed insurances against the loss of the ability to  
   perform gainful employment. The Table lists the institutions in each country by their proper name.  
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Table A4: Features of the disability provisions 
 
Countries Qualifying  conditions  Benefit    Min  max   
Austria  Loss of earning capacity  50%  Disability pension  Like old age pension. Max is 60% of 
assessment base 
Min     
  Contribution  60 months in the last 10 years 
+ 300 months of insurance; or 
180 months in total 
Others related  Care benefit: monthly benefit between 
145,40 to 1,531.50 euro 
Max  60% of assessment 
base 
 Others           
Belgium  Loss of earning capacity  2/3  Disability pension  65% of lost wages with a ceiling (with 
dependents), 40% (with no dependents), 
45% (if no dependents but living with 
no income people) 
Min    25.11 euros a day 
(no dependents), 
28.01 a day (if 
living alone), 35.08 
(with dependents) 
  Contribution  6 months + insurance cover 
during last quarter 
Others related  the 1st year under sickness benefit  Max  36.69 euros a day 
(no dependents), 
59.54 a days (with 
dependents) 
 Others           
Czech Republic  Loss of earning capacity  66% (totale disability); 33% 
(partial disability) 
Disability pension  Full pension: 1,310 CZK + 1,5%/year 
of insurance of the personale 
assessment base
* (min 2,080 CZK). 
Partial disability: 1,310 CZK + 
0,75%/year of insurance of the personal 
assessment base (min 1,695 CZK) 




  Contribution  5 years (up to 4 if <28 years 
of age) of insurance in the last 
10 years 
Others related    Max  no max 
 Others            
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Denmark  Loss of earning capacity  50% (universal disability 
pension); 100% (partial 
unemployment supplement); 
100% (permanent total 
disability pension); 2/3 
(permanent severe disability 
pension); 50% (partial 
disability pension) 
Disability pension  4,377 DKK (monthly), supplement 
4,406 DKK (monthly). 
Min     
 Contribution    Others  related  Disablement supplement (2,129 
DKK/month); unemployment 
supplement (2,939 DKK/month); early 
retirement supplement for partial 
disability (1,113 DKK/months); 
disability allowance (2,142 
DKK/months); outside assistance 
allowance (2,224 DKK/month) 
Max  4,377 DKK a 
month (universal 
basic)+ 4,406 DKK 
a month (disability 
supplement) + 
2,129 DKK a 
month (disablement 
supplement) + 




  Others  3 years of residence since 15 years of age (universal disability pension); 4 to 5 years of residence to have full pension 
France  Loss of earning capacity  2/3  Disability pension  Full pension:50% of average earnings 
in the best paid 10 years (up to a max of 
1,176/month, minimum is 
233,98/month). Partial disability: 30% 
of average earnings in the best paid 10 
years (up to a max of 705,60/months, 
min 233,98/month) 
Min    233.98 euros a 
month 
 Contribution  12  months  Others  related  Constant attendace allowance 
supplement (916,32/months) 
Max  1,176 euros a 
month 
  Others  800 hours of employment in the last 12 months (200 hours in the last 3 months)       
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Germany  Loss of earning capacity  Full reduction (<3 hours of 
work per day) or partial 
reduction (<6 hours per day) 
Disability pension  Like old-age pension. Full pension 
(pension factor 1.0); partial disability 
(pension factor 0.5) 
Min     
  Contribution  5 years of contribution + 36 
months of compulsory 
contributions out of the last 5 
years 
Others related    Max   
 Others           
Greece  Loss of earning capacity  80% (full disability pension); 
50% (partial disability 
pension) 
Disability pension  Like old - age pension. Loss of 80% of 
earning capacity (100% of full old-age 
pension), loss of 67% to 79% (75% of 
full old-age pension); loss of 50% to 
66% (50% of the full old-age pension). 
Minimum 360/month 
Min    360 euros per 
month 
  Contribution  4,500 days; 1,500 days 
(incuding 600 days in the last 
5 years); for <21 years of age 
(300 days in the 5 last years) 
Others related    Max   
 Others           
Ireland  Loss of earning capacity  Permanent incapacity for 
work 
Disability pension  Disability pension: 123,30/week, 
147,30 if >65 years of age; dependent 
supplement: 88/week for adult 
dependent + 19,30/week for each 
dependent child under age 18; disability 
allowance: up to 118,80/week + 78,20 
(adult dependent) + 16,80 (child 
dependent) 
Min     
  Contribution  260 weeks (48 in the last year) Others related  Blind person's pension: up to 
118,80/week + 78,80 for dependent 
adult; special allowance: 7,70/week 
(single pensioner >=66 years of age 
living alone) or 8,40 (if >=80 years of 
age) 
Max  
  Others  1 year of ordinary sickness benefit (<1 year if severe disability)      
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Italy  Loss of earning capacity  total and permanent inability 
to work (disability pension); 
2/3 (disability allowance) 
Disability pension  Disability pension: same as for the old-
age pension + increment based on the 
anticipated n. of years between date of 
onset disability and normal age pension. 
Disability allowance: min 392,69/month
Min    392.69 euros 
(526.46 euros per 
month if 60 years 
old and low 
income). 6,714 
euros a year 
(single), 11,271.39 
euros a year 
(couple) 
  Contribution  5 years (including 3 years in 
the last 5 years) (disability 
pension and allowance) 
Others related  Constant attendance supplement: 
369,27/month 
Max  
  Others  absence of other forms on income (disability pension); reduction of 25% if income = 4 x minimum income and of 50% if income = 5 x 
minimum income (disability allowance) 
The Netherlands  Loss of earning capacity  80% (full pension); 15-80% 
(partial pension); 25-80% 
(unemployed, disabled since 
childhood, students) 
Disability pension  Disability pension (employee): up to 
70% of earnings (80% of disability), 
14-50,75%(15-80% of disability). 
Disability pension (disabled since 
childhood and students): 70% of the 
minimum wage (80% of disability), 
14% to 50,75% (25-80% disability) 
Min     
 Contribution    Others  related  Constant attendance supplement (for 
all): 30% of the full pension 
Max  159.99 a day 
 Others           
Poland  Loss of earning capacity  total or partial disability  Disability pension  Total disability: 24% of the average 
national salary, 1,3% of the worker's 
earning base
(1) x number of contribution 
years, 0,7% of the worker's earning base 
x number of credit years
(2). Partial 
disability: 75% of amount of total 
disability pension 
Min    530.26 zlotys a 
month (total 
disability), 407.88 
zlotys a month 
(partial disability) 
  Contribution  5 years in the last 10 years (1 
to 4 if <30 years of age) 
Others related    Max   
  Others  disability during employment; disability within 18 months of cessation of work      
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Spain  Loss of earning capacity  Loss of normal earning 
capacity 
Disability pension  Pemanent total disability: all work 
(100% of the benefit base up to max 
earnings for contribution purposes); 
occupational (55% of the benefit base + 
20% if >=55 years of age). Permanent 
partial disability: 24 x the monthly 
benefit base for temporary dis. 
Min    385.50 a month (if 
65 years old), 
453.98 euros a 
month (with 
dependent spouse) 
  Contribution  1/2 of the time between 16 
and the onset of disability 
(<26 years of age); 1/4 of the 
time between 20 and the onset 
of disability (>26 years of 
age); at least 5 years, 1/5 of 
contribution in the last 10 
years (in general) 
Others related  Constant attendance supplement: 50% 
of the value of the pension 
Max  
 Others           
Sweden  Loss of earning capacity  3/4,1/2 and 1/4 (universal 
disability pension and 
earnings related disability 
pension) 
Disability pension  Universal disability pension: 90% of 
reduced current base amount x the 
accrued number of 40s and 30s (single 
pensioner); 72,5% (married pensioner). 
Earnings-related disability pension: 
computed as old-age pension. Partial 
disability: 3/4, 1/4 or 1/2 
Min     
 Contribution    Others  related  Constant attendance supplement: up to 
65% of base amount 
Max  
 Others            
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Switzerland  Loss of earning capacity  Base pension: 66,6% (full 
pension); 50% (half pension); 
40% (quarter pension). 
Mandatory occupational 
pension: 66,6% (full pension); 
50% (half pension) 
Disability pension  Base pension: same as old-age pension 
(full, half or quarter pension depending 
on degree of disability). Partial pension: 
% based of the relationship between the 
insured's years of contributions and 
those of their age group. Dependent 
supplement: 30-40% 
Min     
  Contribution  contribution in all years from 
age 21 (minimun 1 year of 
contribution) (base pension) 
Others related  Mandatory occupational pension: 7,2% 
of funds that would be accumulated at 
retirement age. Full pension if 2/3 
disabled, half pension if 50% disabled 
Max  
 Others           
Notes to Table A3:           
The contributions for disability pension are included in the ones paid for the old-age pension; * See old-age benefit for definition of Personal Assessment Base; (1) See old-age pension benefit for 
definition of Worker's earning base; (2) Credit years: for example years spent rearing children. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 